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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY V. STRAND, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PRINCE-COVEY & CO., INC., and 
ALMON COVEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Defendant-appellant Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. sub-
mits this reply brief in response to certain new matters 
raised in the brief of plaintiff-respondent Jerry Strand: 
POINT I 
ARTICLE 8 OF THE UTAH UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE GOVERNS THIS CASE. 
GENERAL RULES OF CONVERSION ARE 
NOT APPLICABLE. 
Plaintiff argues again in the Brief of Appellee as he 
argued in the trial court that knowledge of adverse claims 
Case No. 
13804 
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is immaterial in a conversion action (Brief of Appellee at 
15-16). While this may be correct with respect to conver-
sion of most goods, it is totally erroneous with respect to 
conversion of negotiable securities. 
Plaintiff does not once cite or consider Article 8 of 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code which governs trans-
actions in negotiable securities, but presents for the Court's 
consideration only general statements from Am. Jur. 2d 
and a Utah case involving the conversion of seeds. General 
rules of conversion are not applicable to the conversion of 
negotiable securities; if they were, the securities would no 
longer be negotiable, see Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§233(4). 
The pertinent sections of Article 8 are discussed at 
some length in the Brief of Appellant, and defendant will 
not belabor the point that they are applicable to and con-
trol the issues before this Court. It is sufficient to repeat 
(1) that §70A-8-301(a) provides that a bona fide purchas-
er of a security "acquires {it} free of any adverse claims"; 
(2) that §70A-2-302 defines a bona fide purchaser as one 
who, among other things, takes a security "without notice 
of any adverse claim," and (3) that §70A-8-304(2) pro-
vides that "notice that the security is held for a third per-
son" neither creates a duty of inquiry nor "constitute(s) 
notice of adverse claims." The last section cited goes on to 
require that the purchaser have ffknowledge that the pro-
ceeds are being used or that the transaction is for the in-
dividual benefit of the fiduciary or otherwise in breach of 
duty," before he "is charged with notice of adverse 
claims." (emphasis supplied). 
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Plaintiff apparently does not wish the Court to con-
sider the statutes governing his claim because they point 
directly to its untenability. Almon Covey did not have 
knowledge of plaintiff's claim to ownership of the stock 
and knowledge cannot be imputed to him through Ted 
England. From the record before the trial court, the only 
conclusion consistent with Utah statutory law is that 
Prince-Covey & Company, Inc. was a bona fide purchaser. 
At best (for plaintiff), genuine issues as to defendant's 
knowledge of plaintiff's purported ownership remain in 
dispute and were not properly disposed of on the motion 
for summary judgment. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS EITHER A BONA FIDE 
PURCHASER OR A BROKER-SELLER OF THE 
STOCK CERTIFICATES IN QUESTION. 
In his brief, plaintiff argues for the first time that 
defendant was not a purchaser of the securities in question. 
This is a reversal of the apparent position taken in his 
complaint, in which he alleges that defendant was a pur-
chaser: 
"On September 13, 1972, the defendant Almon 
Covey for himself and as agent of Prince-Covey 
tendered to the lending institution the sums bor-
rowed by Mr. England and in return therefore (sic) 
received the common stock owned by the plaintiff. 
Thereafter, contrary to the rights of plaintiff, the 
defendants exercised ownership rights over the 
common stock of Hoffman Resources, Inc., and, 
upon information and belief, sold the same." Com-
plaint, J8; App. A, Brief of Appellant at 32 (em-
phasis supplied). 
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Defendant does not insist that he was a purchaser of 
the securities, but only that he was either a purchaser 
under the broad definition of the Utah Uniform Com-
mercial Code or a broker who acted as agent for England 
in selling the stock (the latter position being the one that 
plaintiff apparently now espouses). For purposes of this 
appeal, it is not terribly important which status is assigned 
to defendant, since in either case there is a genuine issue 
of material fact as to defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's 
alleged ownership interest in the stock, which requires 
reversal of the summary judgment. 
A. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.A. 
§70A-1-201(33)) defines "purchaser" as "a person who 
takes by purchase" and defines "purchase" as follows: 
" 'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, 
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-
issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creat-
ing an interest in property." §70A-1-201(32), 
U.C.A. 
If defendant had "dominion and control" of the securities 
sufficient for plaintiff to state a cause of action in con-
version, he had an "interest" in them within the defini-
tion of "purchase" set forth in the U.C.C. If it did not 
have an "interest" that was "purchased" by the $4,000 
delivered to Murray First Thrift, Mr. England alone must 
have owned the interest, with no "dominion or control" 
inhering in defendant. The claim for conversion would 
then fall of its own weight, or alternatively must be sup-
ported by allegations of collusion and conspiracy between 
% 
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defendant Prince-Covey and England to convert the se-
curities. No such allegations or facts to support them exist 
in the record. 
Stated somewhat differently, the assertion of "do-
minion and control over . . . goods inconsistent with the 
owner's rights" (Alfred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 76, 328 
P.2d 726 (1958)) which is necessary to state a claim in con-
version must include an assertion of the converter's inter-
est in the goods. This interest itself may be a proprietary 
interest, pursuant to which the converter uses the goods 
or sells them as his own to a third party, or a pecuniary 
interest by which he asserts a right to the proceeds of the 
sale. In either event, and particularly in this case, the 
concept of Prince-Covey's "interest in" the securities can-
not be separated from its alleged status as a converter. 
Whether the interest — the dominion or control — which 
Prince-Covey asserted was justified in fact and in law is 
the entire subject of this action. 
Since defendant is a purchaser of the stock, the ques-
tion posed is whether it is a bona fide purchaser under 
U.C.A. §§70A-8-301 and 302 and thus immune from plain-
tiff's adverse claim. The answer to that issue depends on 
the factual determination of whether defendant acted in 
good faith and without notice of adverse claims — ques-
tions of material fact which were improperly resolved in 
the court below and which thus require reversal as elabo-
rated in appellant's brief. 
B. Plaintiff asserts in his brief that defendant must 
be treated as a broker that sold the stock in question. If 
that is the case, then U.C.A. §70A-8-318 applies: 
5 
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- "Ail agent or bailee who in good faith (including 
observance of reasonable commercial standards if 
he is in the business of buying, selling, or other-
wise dealing with securities) has received securities 
and sold, pledged, or delivered them according to 
the instructions of his principal is not liable for 
conversion or for participation in breach of fiduci-
ary duty although the principal had no right to dis-
pose of them." 
Under this section, the main question is whether the de-
fendant, acting as selling agent for England, acted "in 
good faith" in selling the stock. If he did, then he cannot 
be liable as a converter. ? 
According to the U.C.C., "good faith" means "hon-
esty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 
U.C.A. §70A-1-201(19) (emphasis added). Whether de-
fendant exercised good faith when the instruments in 
question gave no indication on their face of any adverse 
interest is certainly a question of fact that could not be 
resolved from the record before the court below. See 
Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 
N.Y.2d 219, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 234 N.E.2d 230 (1967); 
State Bank of Binghampton v. Bache, 162 Misc. 178, 293 
N.Y.S. 667 (1937). It should be noted that §70A-8-318 re-
quires only good faith, whereas §70A-8-302 (defining 
bona fide purchaser) requires both good faith and lack 
of notice of adverse claims. By negative inference, then, 
under §70A-8-318, notice of an adverse claim, even as 
defined in §70A-8-304(2), may not defeat the protection 
afforded securities brokers who act in good faith. But in 
any case, the question of good faith presents a material 
% 
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factual issue, and the trial court erred in granting a sum-
mary judgment without resolving that issue. 
POINT III 
TED ENGLAND'S KNOWLEDGE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP CANNOT 
BE IMPUTED TO DEFENDANT. 
A principal issue in this case is whether defendant 
had knowledge of plaintiff's alleged ownership interest in 
the stock, and whether Ted England's knowledge should 
be imputed to defendant as a matter of law. If defendant 
had no knowledge of plaintiff's ownership claim, then it 
qualifies either as a bona fide purchaser under U.C.A. 
§70A-8-301, or as a broker acting in good faith under 
U.C.A. §70A-8-318, thus precluding liability for conver-
sion of the stock. 
In the Brief of Appellant, defendant argued at length 
that Ted England's knowledge cannot be imputed to 
Prince-Covey because their positions were adverse in this 
transaction [Brief of Appellant at 8-18}. This argument is 
based on rules of agency law that have been announced 
in Utah and embodied in §279, Restatement (Second) of 
Agency. In response to this, plaintiff argues in effect that 
because Mr. England and Mr. Covey were in each other's 
company when the stock was obtained from Murray First 
Thrift and sold, there existed a "joint" and "mutual" in-
terest between them that encompasses the entire relation-
ship and transaction (Brief of Appellee at 8-9). Because 
of plaintiff's unusual notions of what constitutes adverse 
positions, a brief recapitulation of the relationship be-
tween Prince-Covey and England seems appropriate. 
# 
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First, the two were in the position of creditor-debtor. 
These positions must be considered adverse; if they are 
not, a creditor's suit against his debtor would be dismissed 
for failure to state an adverse claim. It was this adverse 
creditor-debtor relationship which induced England to 
pay defendant the proceeds derived from the sale of the 
stock. The phrase "adverse party" as used in §279 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency must mean that a claim 
or demand exists or may arise between the principal and 
agent that is cognizable in an adversary legal action. Such 
a claim is present in all the cases cited by defendant in its 
brief, and is obviously present in this case. 
Plaintiff implies that Prince-Covey and England had 
a "joint" or "mutual" interest in having the debt ex-
tinguished. This is analogous to arguing that plaintiff and 
defendant in this action have a joint and mutual interest 
in having the claim resolved by a final order of the court. 
Such mutual interests are irrelevant to whether the ad-
verse claim between them defines them as adverse parties. 
Secondly, it is uncontroverted that England never 
informed Mr. Covey of plaintiff's purported ownership 
interest in the stock. It was necessary that England con-
ceal whatever knowledge he had of such ownership inter-
ests to serve his own personal interests, i.e., to extinguish 
his debt and to preserve the stock from defendant's execu-
tion on it.1 In the course of such concealment, he estab-
1
 It should be remembered that plaintiff owes defendant Prince-
Covey $34,696.16 from a prior lawsuit based upon plaintiffs fail-
ure to pay for securities he ordered purchased for his account. Had de-
fendant known of plaintiff's claimed ownership it would have levied upon 
the stock to satisfy this prior judgment. 
® 
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lished yet another "adverse position" with defendant; for 
defendant potentially has a claim against England based 
on the numerous breaches of duty inherent in his deceit. 
Plaintiff in his brief asserts that England and defend-
ant "divided" the proceeds of the sale of the stock (Brief 
of Appellee at 9). This is a distortion of the facts. De-
fendant and England did not "divide the proceeds"; rather, 
the proceeds were used to reduce England's indebtedness 
to defendant. Defendant clearly gave value for the portion 
of the proceeds of the stock which it received. 
On the issue of imputation of knowledge, plaintiff-
appellee sets out several sections from the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, none of which are applicable in this 
case. The sections cited by plaintiff do not apply where, 
as in this case, the agent (England) and the principal (de-
fendant) were acting as adverse parties, and where the 
agent was not acting as an agent in any manner in the 
transaction in question. 
Section 271 of Restatement (Second) of Agency, on 
which plaintiff relies to establish defendant's "notice" of 
his claim, defines situations where a principal or a third 
party will be bound by notification to or from the prin-
cipal's agent when the agent is acting in his own interest, 
but is apparently acting for his principal. The comments 
and illustrations to this section make clear that the rule 
of this section applies only when notification is to the 
agent as an agent. Consider, for example, Example 4 to 
Comment (a): 
"Before tearing down a building adjoining 
T's building, T sends to P's apparently authorized 
# 
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agent, A, a letter telling what he plans to do. A, 
•r hoping harm will come to P, does nothing. T has 
satisfied any requirement of notifying adjoining 
owners." 
Furthermore, the instant case does not involve "notifica-
tion" in any sense. Nothing is alleged either in the com-
plaint or anywhere else that would reasonably imply that 
plaintiff gave some notification to England which would 
bind the principal defendant. Rather, plaintiff is attempt-
ing to impute England's knowledge to Prince-Covey in 
circumstances where their interests were adverse, c.f., 
Comment (d), Restatement (Second) of Agency, §282. 
Section 274, Restatement (Second) of Agency, by its 
terms, applies only where the agent, in his capacity as 
acting agent, acquires property for the principal. The com-
ments to this section, and the case law which it embodies, 
make clear that it is primarily a rule of restitution. Com-
ment (b) provides in part: 
"The rule stated in this Section is not pri-
marily a rule of agency, but of restitution. The 
prima facie liability of the principal exists because 
of unjust enrichment. If the property is obtained 
by conduct for which the principal is not responsi-
ble, he is protected by a change of position. On the 
other hand, if the agent is guilty of tortious conduct 
for which the principal was responsible, a change 
of position is no defense." 
In support of his position, plaintiff quotes Comment 
(c) to §274 incompletely, omitting the last half of the sen-
tence which gives meaning to the statement: 
10 
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"Where an agent, having no power to bind the 
principal by the transaction, acquires property 
from a third person by fraud and, without the 
principal's knowledge, transfers it to the prin-
cipal to make up for past or future embezzlements, 
the principal takes it subject to a constructive trust, 
since he is enriched to the extent of the value of 
the property thus transferred and has given noth-
ing in exchange/' (emphasis supplied). 
In this case, there is no allegation of embezzlement and 
defendant gave value in exchange for the stock or its pro-
ceeds by extinguishing England's debt. 
Consider also Comment (d); 
"The rule stated in this Section does not apply 
where the agent obtains property on his own ac-
count and subsequently, as a vendor, transfers it to 
his principal. In such cases, the agent is not acting 
as agent in the transaction, and, therefore, the 
principal may be a bona fide purchaser; if he is, 
he is not required to surrender the subject matter. 
See §279" (emphasis supplied). 
In summary, the rule stated in §274 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency covers situations and defines 
responsibilities where an agent has improperly obtained 
property from a third person and used it for his principal's 
benefit without the principal's knowledge, and the prin-
cipal has given nothing of value, nor changed his position 
in reliance upon the benefit conferred. These are simply 
not the circumstances of this case, for which the comments 
to §274 direct attention to §279. s 
11 
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Plaintiff also asserts that the rule of Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, §282, is applicable to this case, 
emphasizing subsection (2)(c). The comment to this sub-
section states: 
i 
"(h). . . . If the principal receives a benefit as 
the result of the conduct of an agent, he cannot 
keep the benefit and escape responsibility for the 
means by which it has been acquired, unless he 
takes as a bona fide purchaser, (see Comment (j)) 
or unless there is otherwise a change in his position 
(see Comment (k))" (emphasis supplied). 
Comment (j) is on all fours with the instant case and 
states explicitly that §279 governs bona fide purchaser 
issues. 
"(j). Principal as Bona Fide Purchaser. If the prin-
cipal obtains title to property because of the inde-
pendent fraud of his agent, he may still be a bona 
fide purchaser if, without knowledge of the fraud, 
he pays value to the agent or to another. Thus, as 
stated in §279, if he deals with the agent as an ad-
verse party and receives as a purchaser property 
which the agent had obtained by fraud, he may 
keep it. So, if an agent having embezzled from his 
principal has replaced the embezzled funds with 
others which he has stolen, the principal is pro-
tected if, with or without knowledge of the em-
bezzlement, he settles accounts with the agent." 
Comment (m) further explains the relationship be-
tween §§279 and 282. £ r 
"The rule stated in this Section is to be contrasted 
with the rule stated in §279, which states the rule 
which is applicable when the agent is dealing with 
m Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the principal. In that situation, the agent is not 
only acting adversely to the principal but is known 
by the parties to be acting as an adversary party; 
the agent's knowledge with reference to the trans-
action no more affects the principal than the 
knowledge of any third person, whereas under the 
circumstances dealt with in this Section, the agent 
is acting or purporting to act for the principal, 
and the latter is bound by his knowledge under 
any of the circumstances stated in subsection (2). 
Plaintiff's reliance on §282 is unfounded. The issue 
before the trial court and this Court was and is whether 
defendant's status as a bona fide purchaser can be de-
feated by the imputation of Ted England's knowledge to 
it. The trial court's imputation of England's knowledge 
ignores the rule summarized in §279 of Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency from decisions of this Court and most 
other jurisdictions. The very sections of the Restatement 
on which plaintiff relies point to the rule of §279 as 
governing this case. 
Plaintiff also cites §§235 and 236 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency. These sections deal with whether an 
agent is acting within the scope of employment. Section 
235 provides: 
"An act of a servant is not within the scope of em-
ployment if it is done with no intention to per-
form it as a part of or incident to a service on ac-
count of which he is employed." 
It is puzzling that plaintiff would cite this action since it 
directly supports defendant's position that England was 
not acting within the scope of his employment in the 
13 
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transaction that is the subject matter of this case. By no 
reasonable stretch of the imagination can it be argued that 
England's transfer to defendant of the proceeds from the 
sale of the stock in question was within the scope of his 
employment as an account broker employed by defendant. 
Section 236 states the obvious principle that: 
1
 "Conduct may be within the scope of employment, 
although done in part to serve the purposes of the 
servant, or of a third person." 
This is certainly not to say that conduct is always within 
the scope of employment when done to serve the purposes 
of the servant or of a third person, as plaintiff would 
apparently have the Court believe. Clearly, conduct may 
also be outside the scope of employment, although done 
to serve the agent's interest, and that is often the case. 
Plaintiff's reliance on the cases cited in his brief is 
misplaced. These cases involve either an agent acting as 
an agent or enunciate general principles of conversion 
that do not apply to the conversion of negotiable securities. 
See Restatement (Second) of Torts, §233(4). 
In Barsh v. Mullins, 338 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1959), by 
plaintiff's own description of the case, the agent was acting 
as agent "in the performance of a duty that (the principal} 
had given him the authority to perform." Contrary to 
plaintiff's assertion, it was the dissent in that case, not the 
majority, that relied upon §282 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency. 
• : • • ; • ? ; « v : . • • ; \ f . • 4 ^ ^ ••; . - • • • • : • : * : 
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Plaintiff cites two cases, Moses v. Archie McFarland 
& Son, 119 Utah 602, 230 P.2d 571 (1951), and Thirteenth 
and Washington Street Corp. v. Nelson, 123 Utah 70, 254 
P.2d 847 (1953), in support of his argument that defend-
ant ratified the acts of England's conversion by accepting 
the benefits of the sale of stock. Each of these cases in-
volves situations where the agent was acting as agent, in 
contrast to the case a hand. Furthermore, the principles 
of ratification enunciated in them do not apply to cir-
cumstances involving a bona fide purchaser or broker-
seller of negotiable securities. 
In Malta v. Giles, 100 Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208 (1941), 
the statute in force at that time required that the owner 
endorse stock for transfer or that written authority of the 
agent must accompany a certificate. In that case, neither 
of those elements were present, and the court held that 
such absence "is a warning to others to deal at arms 
length" 114 P.2d at 211. The case is clearly inapplicable 
because under present statutes there are no such require-
ments for the transfer of stock in bearer form. 
In Latsis v. Nick Floor, 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 
(1940), it was held that where an agent entered into a 
lease agreement with the third party and the third party 
made valuable and permanent improvements on the prop-
erty, the principal may not accept the benefits of that 
performance and deny the liabilities, provided that the 
principal has knowledge of such benefits. Once again this 
case deals with an agent dealing with a third party as an 
agent of the principal and has no application to this case, 
where England was not acting as defendant's agent. More-
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over the rules regarding ratification of contracts are in-
applicable to bona fide purchasers of negotiable securities, 
which must be governed by Article 8 of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
. . ! ; • • • > £ • ' < . ' • , ) # - . - . • - • - i . •• 
As pointed out in defendant-appellant's brief, Allred 
v. Hinkley, supra, correctly states the general law of con-
version. However, as explained in defendant's brief (Brief 
of Appellant at 8-18), those rules do not apply with re-
spect to a bona fide purchaser of negotiable securities. 
Where negotiable securities are involved, the Utah Uni-
form Commercial Code controls, and a bona fide pur-
chaser or a broker who sells in good faith is protected 
against an adverse claim sounding in conversion. See 
U.C.A. §§70A-9-301(2) and 70A-8-318. 
POINT IV 
THE DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF STRAND 
DOES NOT DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP 
AND DATE-OF-NOTICE ISSUES. 
The deposition of plaintiff Strand was not a part of 
the record before this Court when appellant's brief was 
prepared. Defendant does concede, however, that, in view 
of absence of affidavits or other evidence controverting 
plaintiff's depositional testimony, the trial court at the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, if it con-
sidered the deposition at all, was left with the choice of 
accepting or doubting the statements therein only on the 
basis of the inherent credibility of the deposition itself. 
The portions of it quoted in the Brief of Appellee are 
average examples of the directness of plaintiff's answers 
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and the general probative value of the information elicited 
from him. The problems with Strand's status as pledgor 
of the stock, and the consequent issue of his right to im-
mediate possession discussed in the Brief of Appellant at 
21-22, are never clearly explained. On the one hand, Mr. 
Strand testifies that England was constantly indebted to 
him; on the other, that stock with a value of $12,000 to 
$15,000 was pledged by him to England in consideration 
of a debt of $1,500 that he owed England. (Deposition of 
Jerry Strand at 4-6 and 11-13.) Nevertheless, the owner-
ship and conversion-date issues set out in the Brief of 
Appellant at 18-25 were not strongly urged at the hearing 
for summary judgment, and it would be unreasonable 
to expect a trial court to give a deposition the attention 
that would reveal the infirmities that defendant maintains 
inhere in Strand's testimony. The deposition is now in 
the record. Defendant respectfully submits that it deserves 
the consideration of this appellate Court to determine its 
value for establishing the facts which plaintiff claims it 
proves.2 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this reply brief and the Brief 
of Appellant, plaintiff's contentions that defendant was 
not a bona fide purchaser are without foundation and 
2
 Internal contradictions and infirmities in testimony may of course 
always be considered by the trier of faa. This Court has stated that it 
will review the record on appeal from summary judgment in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom judgment is entered. Gammon 
v. Federated Milk Producers Asfn, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018 
(1961). .,..
 u 
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genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute when 
the trial court entered its summary judgment. The judg-
ment should accordingly be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD, 
MILLER & GELDZAHLER 
Frederick S. Prince, Jr., Esq. 
Michael F. Heyrend, Esq. 
J. Rand Hirschi, Esq. 
455 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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